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ARBITRATION OF WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS: FEDERAL LAW
AND COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
Norris Case:*
Introduction
For employees in the non-union workplace, compulsory
arbitration of employment discrimination is generally permissible
and increasingly prevalent. However, employers with unionized
workforces generally may not compel arbitration of employment
discrimination claims.1 Although there is conflicting law among the
federal courts, an increase in mandatory arbitration does not appear
to be the trend for resolving employment discrimination disputes in
union settings.2 Indeed, union employees will most likely continue
* Norris Case is an associate at Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein in Mineola,
New York and is currently a member of the Bar Association of the City of
New York Labor and Employment Law Committee. Mr. Case received his
J.D. degree from Harvard University Law School and his B.A. degree from
Harvard College. The author wishes to express thanks to Lois Carter
Sehlissel, a partner at Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein for reading and
providing comments on the manuscript.
See Alexander v. Gardener-Denver 415 U.S. 36 (holding that an employee
is not precluded from litigating an employment discrimination claim in federal
court where he has raised the same claim in arbitration); See also Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1990) (rejecting compulsory
arbitration of statutory discrimination claims for unionized employees). See
also Barentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981);
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
2 See Felt v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 60 F.3d 1416 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that a railroad employees' Title VII, religious
discrimination claim was not subject to arbitration under a collective
bargaining agreement); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698
(11th Cir. 1992) (holding that an employees' Title VII, sexual harassment,
claim was not subject to compulsory arbitration under Federal Arbitration
Act). But see Austin v. Owens-Broadway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875
(4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a discharged employee was compelled to arbitrate
her Title VII and ADA claims under a collective bargaining agreement); Maye
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to have the option of pursuing claims for race, gender, age,
disability, and other discrimination through the grievance-
arbitration machinery as well as through judicial process.' This
article addresses the relevant precedent concerning mandatory
arbitration of statutory discrimination claims. In addition, this
article surveys the conflicting law on compulsory arbitration and
reasons for and against utilizing compulsory arbitration.
Background: Availability of Mandatory Arbitration of
Discrimination Claims For Unionized Employers
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,4 the Supreme Court held that an
employee is not precluded from litigating an employment
discrimination claim in federal court where he has raised the same
claim in arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.5
The Court ruled that an employee does not waive his individual
statutory rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
[hereinafter "Title VII" ]6 by exercising his collectively bargained
rights .'
Gardner-Denver Company hired Harrell Alexander, Sr., a black
man, in May 1966, to work as a maintenance worker in its Denver
v. Smith Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that an
employee was compelled to arbitrate a Title VII claim under a "principals of
employment" agreement signed by all employees).
3 See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974);
Barentine v. Arkansas Best-Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981);
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Bates v. Long Island
Railroad Co., 997 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1993); Lachance v. Northeast
Publishing, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 177 (D. Mass. 1997).
4 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
' Id. at 54.
6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. Title
VII assures "equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices
and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971) (holding the requirement that an applicant have a high school
education and pass a standardized intelligence test as violative of Title VII in that
the requirement was not job related and operated to disqualify a disproportionate
number of African-Americans).
7Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51-52.
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Colorado facility!s Two years later, Alexander was awarded a
trainee position as a drill operator.9  Nevertheless, he was
discharged one year later, for allegedly producing too many
defective parts.'0 Immediately after the discharge, Alexander filed
a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement between his
employer and his union, Local 3029, United Steelworkers of
America, alleging that he had been unjustly discharged." Pursuant
to the collective bargaining agreement, a four-step grievance was
processed by the union against Gardner-Denver. 2
8 Id. at38.
9Id.
10 Id.
1 Id. at 39 ("The grievance stated: 'I feel I have been unjustly discharged
and ask that I be reinstated with full seniority and pay.'").
1 Id. at 40-41 n. 3. The grievance procedure of Gardner-Denver as set forth in
the collective bargaining agreement was a four step procedure with a fifth step
consisting of a referral to arbitration. Id. The four grievance steps are standard
collectively bargained grievance procedures, and are enumerated as follows:
Step 1. An attempt shall first be made by the employee with
or without his assistant grievance committeeman (at the
employee's option), and the employee's foreman to settle the
grievance. The foreman shall submit his answer within one
(1) working day and if the grievance is not settled, it shall be
reduced to writing, signed by the employee and his assistant
grievance committeeman, and the foreman shall submit his
signed answer of such grievance.
Step 2. If the grievance is not settled in Step 1, it shall be
presented to the Superintendent, or his representative, within
two (2) working days after the Union has received the
Foreman's answer in Step 1. The Superintendent or his
representative shall submit his signed answer two (2)
working days after receiving the Grievance.
Step 3. If the grievance is not settled in Step 2, it shall be
presented to the manager of Manufacturing or his
representative within five (5) working days after the Union
has received the answer in Step 2. The manager of
Manufacturing or his representative shall meet with the
representatives of the Union to attempt to resolve the
grievance within five (5) working days following the
presentation of a grievance. The Manager of Manufacturing
or his representative shall submit his signed answer within
three (3) working days after the date of such meeting.
1998
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At the fourth step of the grievance process, Alexander raised for
the first time, a charge of racial discrimination. 3 The employer
denied the grievance and Alexander's claim of discrimination."
After the grievance was denied, and prior to arbitration, Alexander
filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, which was referred to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission [hereinafter "EEOC"]."5  At his
arbitration hearing, Alexander testified and evidence was presented
in connection with his claim of racial discrimination.16
Notwithstanding the evidence submitted by the union and
Alexander, the arbitrator upheld Alexander's discharge.' 7
The EEOC determined that there was not reasonable cause to
believe a violation of Title VII had occurred."8 Accordingly,
Alexander received a notice of his right to sue. 9 Thereafter, he
filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of Colorado,
alleging a violation of Title VII.2" The employer moved for
summary judgment, claiming that the issues had already been
Step 4. If the grievance is not settled in Step 3, it shall be
referred to the Personnel Manager, and/or his representatives
and the International representative and chairman of the
grievance committee within five (5) working days after the
Union has received the Step 3 answer. Within ten (10)
working days after the grievance has been referred to Step 4,
the above mentioned parties shall meet for the purpose of
discussing such grievance. Within five (5) working days
following the meeting, the Company representatives shall
submit their signed answer to the Union. The Union
representatives shall signify their concurrence or non-
concurrence and affix their signatures to the grievance.
Id.
3 Id. at42.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 42-43.
" Id. at43.
19 Id.
201d.
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submitted to and decided by the arbitrator, and were therefore
precluded.2'
The district court agreed with the employer, finding that
Alexander elected to pursue his remedies through arbitration under
the non-discrimination clause of the collective bargaining
agreement, and was therefore precluded from filing a subsequent
suit under Title VII' The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's decision.23 However, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that, at least in the collective bargaining
agreement context, an agreement to arbitrate a discrimination claim
does not preclude an employee from seeking subsequent relief
under Title VII, including pursuing the Title VII claim in court.2 4
Moreover, the Court held that such employment discrimination
claims will be reviewed de novo.2'
The Alexander Court rejected the election of remedies analysis
espoused by the district court, and held that Tide VII is not
necessarily linked to the grievance-arbitration machinery of
collective bargaining agreements.2 Essential to the Court's
decision was its determination of the question of whether invocation
of rights under the collective bargaining agreement constituted a
waiver of an employee's individual statutory rights.zY The statutory
Title VII right invoked by Alexander was an individual right, as
compared with the majoritarian processes of collectively bargained
21 Id.
' Id. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, 346 F. Supp. 1012
(D. Colo. 1971).
Alerander, 415 U.S. at 43. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Company, 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
24 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49.
2 Id. at 60.
26 Id. at 45-47. The District Court, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, held Alexander was "bound by the arbitral decision and had no right
to sue under Title VII." Id. at 45. This holding was "dictated by notions of
election of remedies and waiver and by the federal policy of favoring
arbitration of labor disputes." Id. at 46. The United States Supreme Court in
reversing held that the statutory enforcement rights of Title VII are vested in
the plenary power of the federal courts. Id. at 47.
27 Id. at 49 (holding that an "individual does not forfeit his [Title VII] cause
of action if he pursues his grievance to final arbitration.").
1998
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rights.2" Thus, the Court held, a waiver of a significant and definite
individual right may not occur by the exercise of collective rights.29
The Court also found problematic, the utilization of the
grievance-arbitration machinery as an alternative to adjudication by
the courts.30 Indeed, the Court was openly critical of arbitration as
a forum for statutory disputes under Title VII by stating:
Arbitral disputes, while well suited to the resolution of
contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights
created by Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the
special role of the arbitrator, whose task is to effectuate
the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of the
enacted legislation. Where the collective bargaining
agreement conflicts with Title VII, the arbitration must
follow the agreement.31
The Court noted that the relative unfamiliarity of labor arbitrators
with statutory discrimination law was a significant reason for not
substituting court adjudication with more informal labor
arbitration.3'  Also, the Court recognized that in arbitration, the
usual rules of evidence do not apply, and rights to discovery and
cross-examination are often circumscribed.33  The Court's
reluctance concerning arbitration as a forum for Title VII claims,
led to its holding that labor arbitrations would not have preclusive
effect over judicial claims of discrimination.34
' AId. at 51.
29 Id. at 51-52. Since Alexander, the Court has generally maintained the
position that individual statutory rights are not waived in the grievance-arbitration
process. See, e.g., Barrantine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S.
728 (1981) (holding an individual's right to pursue claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act are not precluded if such issues were also arbitrated under a
collective bargaining agreement).
3 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47.
31Id. at 56-57.
32 Id. at 57-58.
33 Id.
3 Id. at 51 (asserting that congressional intent behind Title VII, that
employees not be subject to workplace discrimination, would be defeated if the
collective-bargaining process served as a waiver of these rights and barred a
federal Title VII cause of action).
844 [Vol 14
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In more recent years, the Supreme Court has retrenched from the
broad pronouncements enumerated in the Alexander decision.35
Recently, the Court has urged the use of arbitration to resolve
employment discrimination claims.36 In fact, although the holding
in Alexander still stands, federal district and courts of appeal have
issued several decisions limiting the scope of Alexander.37
The Supreme Court Promotes Mandatory Arbitration of
Statutory Discrimination Claims: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane"
In 1991, the Supreme Court breached new territory in the
employment discrimination landscape by allowing an employer to
enforce mandatory arbitration provisions of an employment
agreement.
39
Robert Gilmer was hired by Interstate as a financial services
manager." As a condition of his employment, Gilmer was
required to register "as a securities representative with several
stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange"
[hereinafter "NYSE"].41 Gilmer completed, as part of his
registration, an application 2 in which he "agree[d] to arbitrate
any dispute, claim, or controversy [between Gilmer and
" See generally Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir.
1996); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995); Miller
Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir.
1984); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.
1982); Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
3 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3 See generally Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir.
1996); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995);
Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th
Cir. 1984); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d
Cir. 1982); Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
3 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
391 d. at 26-27.
40 Id. at 23.
41 Id.
41 Id. Gilmer completed a standard application, the "Uniform Application for
Securities Industry Registration or Transfer." Id.
1998 845
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Interstate] that is required to be arbitrated under the rules,
constitutions or by-laws of the organizations with which [he]
registers. "43
In addition to the securities registration application, Gilmer was
subject to NYSE regulations concerning arbitration."
Particularly, NYSE required arbitration of "[a] controversy
between a registered representative and any other[sic] member
organization arising out of the employment or termination of
employment of such registered representative. "'5
After six years of employment with Interstate, Gilmer was
terminated.46  Notwithstanding his agreement to arbitrate
employment disputes, Gilmer filed a charge with the EEOC age
discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act [hereinafter "ADEA"].47 Gilmer, thereafter,
filed a complaint alleging age discrimination in violation of the
ADEA in the United States District Court for the Western District
of South Carolina.48
Interstate responded to Gilmer's complaint by filing a motion to
compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act
[hereinafter "FAA"].'" Interstate's position was that the arbitration
agreement signed by Gilmer required that his ADEA claim be
arbitrated.50 The district court, relying on the Supreme Court's
43 Id.
4Id.
41 Id. at 23; N.Y.S.E. RuLE 347.
46 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
47 Id. at 23-24. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). The purpose behind the
ADEA is to prevent an employer from discriminating against any person
regarding hiring, discharging, compensation, privileges, or terms and conditions
of employment based upon that person's age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(A).
48 Gilner, 500 U.S. at 23.
49Id. at 24.
o Id. In Gilmer, in Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Marshall, Justice Stevens wrote that the FAA excludes contracts of employment
such as the Interstate/NYSE contracts from its coverage. Id. at 36-37 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded that the U-4 arbitration
agreement was not enforceable under the FAA. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The majority had bypassed this argument by finding that Gilmer's contract was
846 [Vol 14
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earlier ruling in Alexander, denied Interstate's motion to compel
arbitration.5' The district court concluded that "Congress intended
to protect ADEA claimants from the waiver of a judicial forum. " 2
Interstate appealed the decision of the district court to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 53 The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding
that there was no legislative history precluding the arbitration of
ADEA claims, and that Alexander did not preclude mandatory
arbitration.54
Gilmer sought review in the Supreme Court, and the Court
granted certiorari "to resolve [the] conflict among the circuits. " '
In addressing the issue of whether the ADEA claim was subject to
mandatory arbitration, the Court first assessed the mandate of the
FAA to "reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been
adopted by American courts. 56 By the time the Gilmer case was
heard it was clear that a panoply of statutory claims could be
arbitrated.57 In fact, the Court noted that numerous statutory claims
were subject to arbitration under the broad mandate of the FAA.58
The Court also emphasized that by pursuing arbitration as a
means of resolving a statutory claim, a party does not forego his or
her substantive statutory rights.59  Rather, a party's substantive
statutory rights remain unaffected by an arbitration agreement.6°
not an employment contract, because his contract was a contract with the
securities exchanges, not with his employer, Interstate. Id. at 25 n.2.
51 Id. at 24.
2 Id.
5 Id.
54Id.
55 Id.
56Id.
7Id. at 26.
" Id. The Court observed that arbitration was held to be enforceable in
connection with claims under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1-7; §10(b) (1997)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1997); the civil
provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [RICO], 18
U.S.C. §1961 (1984); and, §12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§771(2) (1997). See Gibner, 500 U.S. at 26.59 Id. at 26.
6 Id.
1998 847
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The Court concluded that arbitration should generally be permitted
as a viable means of resolving statutory claims, unless legislative
intent evinces a desire to otherwise preclude arbitration.61
Gilmer raised several challenges to mandatory arbitration of
ADEA claims, arguing that the ADEA was designed to further not
only individual interests, but broader social policies which the
arbitration process is not designed to address. 62 Responding to this
assertion, the Court recognized that arbitration tends to address
specific disputes and does not generally focus on the broader social
objectives incorporated in the ADEA. 63 Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively
[vindicates his] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the
statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function."64
The Court was equally unpersuaded by Gilmer's claim that by
compelling arbitration, the EEOC's role in enforcing the age
discrimination statute would be undermined.65 The Court found
that an aggrieved party's right to file a charge with the EEOC will
not be precluded if they pursue arbitration.66 Furthermore, the
Court noted, the EEOC has independent authority to investigate
claims of discrimination, irrespective of the initiation of judicial
action.67
Gilmer further argued that compulsory arbitration of statutory age
discrimination claims is inappropriate, because compulsory
arbitration would deprive claimants of the judicial forum provided
for in the ADEA. 6' The Court summarily rejected this proposition,
finding that no provisions existed in the ADEA which preclude
waiver of the judicial forum in favor of arbitration.69
61 Id.
62 id. at27.
63 Id. at 27-28.
6 Id. at 28.
65 Id.
6 Id.
6 Id.
6 Id. at29.
69 Id.
[Vol 14
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After the Court rejected Gilmer's substantive challenges to
mandatory arbitration of the age discrimination claim, it considered
challenges to the adequacy of the arbitration process.70 Gilmer
argued that arbitration panels would be biased towards employers.7'
The Court disagreed, citing several protections offered under the
NYSE arbitration rules.'
Under the NYSE procedures, the parties would be informed
about the arbitrators' employment history.72 The parties could
make inquiries concerning the arbitrators' background. 4 Each
party could exercise one peremptory challenge to an arbitrator
without cause, and an unlimited amount of challenges for cause.'S
Finally, the FAA provides for vacation of an arbitration award
where it is evident that the arbitrator was partial or corrupt.76
Gilmer also argued that the discovery procedure in arbitration
would make it difficult to prove discrimination. 7 To this argument,
the Court responded that age discrimination does not require any
more extensive discovery than other statutory claims.7" The Court
suggested that a party trades "the procedures and opportunity for
70 1d. at 30.
71 id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
741d.
75id.
76 Id. at 30-31. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b)(1970). Section 10(b) states:
The United States district court for the district wherein an
award was made that was issued pursuant to section 580 of
title 5 may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of a person, other than a party to the arbitration,
who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the award, if the
use of arbitration or the award is clearly inconsistent with the
factors set forth in section 572 of title 5.
Id.
'n Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
78 The Court also pointed to NYSE discovery regulations, which set forth rules
on the taking of depositions, document production, information requests, and
subpoenas. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32 (relying on Arbitration, N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH), J 2608-10, 2612(d), 2619-20, 2627(a), 2627(e), 2627(f) (Nov. 1995)).
1998 849
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review" available in a judicial forum for the expedited process of
arbitration.79
Another flaw in the arbitral mechanism cited by Gilmer, is the
lack of arbitral jurisprudence that arises from the failure of some
arbitrators to publish their opinions.8" The Court observed,
however, that NYSE rules required arbitration awards be in
writing, and that the awards summarize both the controversy and a
description of the award.8" Based on these requirements, the Court
rejected Gilmer's claim alleging a deficiency in arbitral precedent.8
Furthermore, judicial decisions would continue to offer guidance
for practitioners in the arbitral forum. 3
One of the most significant challenges raised 4 by Gilmer was that
the unequal bargaining power that exists between employers and
employees should preclude enforceability of employment
agreements with compulsory arbitration provisions.8' The Court
rejected this challenge, finding that inequality in bargaining power
does not require invalidation of an employment contract. 86 Rather,
the Court found that each contract must be weighed separately to
determine if there are grounds for revocation, such as "fraud or
overwhelming power.""
"I Id. (reasoning that limited discovery is a tradeoff for more expeditious
proceedings and relaxed rules of evidence).
0 Id. at 31-32.
81 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32 (relying on Arbitration, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH),
2608-10, 2612(d), 2619-20, 2627(a), 2627(e), 2627(f) (Nov. 1995)).
2 Id. at 32.831d. at31.
" Gilmer also argued that arbitrations do not complement the ADEA inasmuch
as they do not allow for broad equitable relief and class actions. Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 32. The Court found that although the ADEA provides for such relief,
conciliation of individual disputes, by means of arbitration, should be permitted
since there is no preclusion against such conciliation in the ADEA. Id.
85 Id. at 32-33.
86 Id.
I d. at 33. The Court stated:
Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported
claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort
of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would
provide grounds "for the revocation of any
contract." . .. There is no indication in this case, however,
850 [Vol 14
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Although the Court reached a different result in Gilmer than in its
earlier decision in Alexander, the Court refrained from overruling
Alexander on its merits. 88 Instead, the Court drew a distinction
between an "employee's contractual right under a collective
bargaining agreement" and an employee's individual statutory
rights, observing that employees' collective bargaining rights
should not necessarily interfere with employees' exercise of
individual statutory rights.8 By so holding, the Court drew a sharp
distinction in the labor and employment law landscape, rejecting
compulsory arbitration of statutory discrimination claims for
unionized workers, while requiring non-unionized workers to
arbitrate their employment discrimination claims [a strange result
indeed] .9
Lower Federal Courts Have Reached Conflicting Results
Concerning Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination
Claims Brought by Unionized Employees
Until recently, federal courts consistently held, pursuant to
Alexander, that an employee could not be compelled to arbitrate
discrimination claims where the employee's collective bargaining
agreement provided for arbitration.9 However, in 1996, in Austin
v. Owens-Broclvay Glass Container Inc.,' the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Gilmer and its progeny have altered the
landscape so significantly in the area of compulsory arbitration of
that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or
defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause or his
registration application. As with the claimed procedural
inadequacies discussed above, this claim of unequal
bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific cases.
Id.
SId.
89Id. at 34-35.
9 Id.
9 See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728
(1981); Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir.
1958); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992).
9 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
1998
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discrimination claims93 that Alexander has become obsolete. 94 The
Austin court concluded that it is of no moment that an agreement to
arbitrate occurs in the context of a collective bargaining agreement
or in the context of individual employment contracts. 9'
In the dissent in Austin, Judge Hall criticized the majority's
disregard for the decision in Alexander.96  Particularly, he wrote
that the majority failed to make a critical distinction between the
individual rights of the unionized employee and the employee's
collective rights. 97 By inexplicably failing to adequately consider
this distinction, the majority never reached the issue of whether the
individual's invocation of collective rights is sufficient to waive the
individual statutory rights.9"
Other courts have adhered strictly to Alexander denying
compulsory arbitration in union settings. 99 For example, the
Seventh Circuit in Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co.' °  applied
Alexander, and dismissed the employer's motion to stay two Title
93 See Almante v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 959 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1997)
(adopting the Fourth Circuit's analysis). In Almonte, the court found that specific
language in a collective bargaining agreement arbitration provision, which
permitted arbitration of federal employment claims constituted a specific waiver
of the employees rights to seek relief in the judicial forum. Id. The collective
bargaining agreement in that case provided that employees were required to
submit to arbitration claims under "Federal Laws, order[s] and regulations
pertaining to equal employment opportunity." Id. at 574 n. 2. Inasmuch as that
collective bargaining agreement specifically included statutory discrimination
claims, the district court ordered mandatory arbitration of the employee's race
discrimination claim. Id.
94 Austin, 78 F.3d at 880-85.
951d. at 885.
96 Id. at 887 (Hall, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 886-87 (Hall, J., dissenting).
98 Id. (Hall, J., dissenting). Judge Hall also reflected on the Court's effort in
Gilmer to distinguish Alexander, rather than overruling it. Id. (Hall, J.,
dissenting). By so doing, Judge Hall affirmed the court's commitment to assuring
employees of their individual right to pursue statutory discrimination claims in the
judicial forum. Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
99 See, e.g., Varner v. National Super Markets, 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996);
Felt v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, 60 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995).
'0' 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997).
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VII actions pending grievance-arbitration.'0 ' Judge Richard A.
Posner wrote the opinion, finding that Alexander was not overruled,
or so eviscerated by Gilmer, as to be obsolete.'" Furthermore,
Judge Posner observed that the grievance-arbitration machinery in
the collective bargaining context is an inappropriate forum for
resolution of most workplace discrimination claims.' Most
significantly, the union is responsible for processing employee
grievances, not the individual employees.'4 Therefore, if the union
decides not to proceed with an individual employee's grievance,
that employee's statutory rights may be improperly foreclosed."
While an employee may sue the union for failing to grieve-arbitrate
his or her claim1° , a decision not to grieve-arbitrate will be
reviewed deferentially by a reviewing court.' ° Judge Posner
recognized that the grievance-arbitration machinery can create
barriers for individual discrimination claimants who wish to
exercise their rights.108 For this reason, the court concluded that
mandatory arbitration in connection with a collective bargaining
agreement is improper.1°9 Moreover, inasmuch as Alexander was
not overruled, compulsory arbitration in the context of a collective
bargaining agreement generally remains impermissible."0
The Legacy of Gilmer In the Non-Union Workplace:
Compulsory Arbitration Pursuant to An Employment Contract
Numerous decisions have been reached since Gilmer concerning
the availability of compulsory arbitration of statutory discrimination
101 Id. at 364-65.
1 21d. at 364.
1031d. at 362-63.
1I4d. at 362.
105 Id.
1o1 Employees may bring claims against their union and employer for failure to
grieve or arbitrate a grievance. See Labor Management Relations Act §301, 29
U.S.C. §185 (1947) (stating that employees may assert such claims as a breach
of the union's duty of fair representation).
o7 Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362.
103 Id.
109Id. at 363.
110Id.
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claims in the non-union environment."' Indeed, employers,
employees, the courts, and the EEOC have joined the sometimes
heated debate pertaining to the viability of compulsory arbitration
and voluntary arbitration in resolving statutory employment
discrimination claims. 1
12
With regard to compulsory arbitration, courts have generally
followed the decision in Gilmer, and required arbitration."'
However, some courts have nevertheless evaded compulsory
arbitration by innovatively interpreting Gilmer, and incorporating
certain themes from Alexander.' In Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Lai,"5 the Ninth Circuit found that the public policy protecting
victims from discrimination and harassment, through anti-
discrimination statutes, is at least as strong as the public policy in
favor of arbitration.1 16  The court held that a plaintiff alleging
discrimination under Title VII could only be forced to forego
statutory remedies and arbitrate the discrimination claims if the
plaintiff knowingly agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration.1 7
In Lai, plaintiffs Justine Lai and Elvira Viernes, sales
representatives employed by Prudential Insurance Company of
America, sued Prudential and their immediate supervisor in state
court alleging that they had been raped by their supervisor, that
Id. See Maye v. Smith Barney Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that where employees brought a claim against their employer under Title
VH and the New York Human Rights Law, that Congress did not intend to
preclude the parties from arbitrating such claim); Topf v. Warnaco, 942 F. Supp.
762 (D. Conn 1996) (holding that an employee's statutory claims are subject to
arbitration where a former employee alleged that his termination violated the
Rehabilitation Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. See Oldroyd v. Elmira Savings Bank, 956 F. Supp. 393 (W.D.N.Y.
1997) (holding that a claim for retaliatory discharge was not within the scope of
the arbitration clause); Krahel v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 971 F.
Supp. 440 (D.C. Or. 1997) (holding that the employee's claims under Title VII
were not barred by the arbitration clause in the context of collective bargaining
agreement).
11 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1301.
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they were harassed, and that they were sexually abused."'
Prudential responded by filing an action in the federal district court
to compel arbitration of the state law claims and to stay the court
proceedings. 19
In seeking arbitration, Prudential relied on a provision in a U-4
employment form signed by Lai and Viernes.12W The agreement
contained a provision requiring the plaintiffs "to arbitrate any
dispute, claim or controversy that... is required to be arbitrated
under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations
with which [they] register."' Plaintiffs thereafter registered
with the National Association of Securities Dealers [hereinafter
"NASD"], which required that "[a]ny dispute, claim or
controversy eligible for submission under part I of this Code
between or among members and/or associated
persons... arising in connection with the business of such
member(s) or in connection with the activities of such associated
person(s), shall be arbitrated under this Code"2'
The district court granted Prudential's motion to stay the court
action and to compel arbitration." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
Ct. of Appeals reversed and vacated the district court's order. 124
The Ninth Circuit held that by signing the U-4 form, the plaintiffs
did not agree to arbitrate their sexual discrimination claim.'5
Because both the U-4 form and the NASD arbitration clause had
failed to refer to sex discrimination, or even generally to
discrimination claims, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could
not have understood that by signing those forms they would be
subject to mandatory arbitration of their discrimination claims. 26
Indeed, the U-4 form did not even specifically refer to
'1 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1302.
121 Id. at 1301.
12 Id. at 1302.
2DId. at 1301.
124 Id. at 1305.12Id.
2 Id.
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"employment" disputes as being covered under the arbitration
provision."
The majority, in overturning the district court's order to compel
arbitration, agreed with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Farrand v.
Lutheran Brothers.2 1 In Farrand, the employer also sought to
compel arbitration under the FAA. 129 Farrand, like Lai, involved a
stockbroker registration form.130 In Farrand, the Seventh Circuit
found that the employer could not compel arbitration under the
employee's U-4 form, because the NASD rules did not specifically
require arbitration of employment disputes.' The NASD rules in
Farrand, unlike the NYSE rules in Gilmer did not specifically
authorize arbitration in the context of employment disputes.
127 Id.
12 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993)
'
29 Id. at 1254.
130id.
' Id. at 1255.
132 The court recognized that the NASD rules covered disputes generally
between customers and members, members and members, or between the NASD
and registered clearing agencies, but not between employee-members and
employers. Id. Specifically NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, §1 states:
This Code of Arbitration Procedure is prescribed.., for the
arbitration of any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of
or in connection with the business of any member of
[NASD], with the exception of disputes involving the
insurance business of any member which is also an insurance
company:
(1) between or among members; (2) between or among
members and public customers, or others; and (3) between or
among members, registered clearing agencies with which
[NASD] has entered into an agreement to utilize [NASD's]
arbitration facilities and procedures, and participants,
pledgees or other persons using the facilities of a registered
clearing agency, as these terms are defined under the rules of
such a registered clearing agency.
Id. Farrand, 993 F.2d at 1254. By reading this section of the NASD code, it
does not appear that arbitration of individual workplace discrimination claims are
covered by this section. There is no reference to individual claims for
discrimination. Id. For this reason, the court concluded that an employee, by
agreeing to this provision, did not waive his right to pursue their individual
statutory discrimination claim in court. Id.
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Other appellate courts including the Third Circuit,' the Fifth
Circuit,'4 the Sixth Circuit,' the Tenth Circuit, 3 ' and the
Eleventh Circui 37 have accorded Gilmer a less restrictive
interpretation than the Seventh Circuit in Farrand. In fact, a survey
of federal court decisions addressing this issue reveals that
compulsory arbitration is generally favored. 138
The Employer Perspective
The availability of arbitration as a cost effective alternative to
protracted litigation has caused many employers to seek out
mandatory arbitration at the outset of employment. And in the
union context, as demonstrated by Almonte and Austin, in limited
circumstances a court may consider a well-tailored arbitration
provision in a collective bargaining agreement to waive statutory
rights. Indeed, unionized employees may seek to negotiate well-
131 See Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Feaner & Smith, 7 F.3d 1110 (3d
Cir. 1993) (holding that trustees are subject to compulsory arbitration of ERISA
claims).
11 See Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir.
1995).
See Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a registered securities representative was required to arbitrate her
statutory claims pursuant to arbitration clause in U-4 securities registration form).
136 See Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding that a broker is required to arbitrate based on arbitration
clause NASD registration).
"r See Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Son, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a broker is required to arbitrate under registration agreement with
NASD and the New York Stock Exchange).
' Although the Second Circuit has not decided a case concerning compulsory
arbitration under Gilner, several courts in the Second Circuit have imposed
mandatory arbitration based on Gilmer. See, e.g., Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc.,
897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a discrimination claim was
subject to mandatory arbitration, rejecting the analysis of the Ninth Circuit);
DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 936 F. Supp 104 (S.D.N.Y 1996), aftd,
121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997). In fact, despite the ruling in Farrand, the Seventh
Circuit appears more receptive in recent cases to compulsory arbitration of
discrimination claims. See Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims are valid and
enforceable).
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tailored and explicit arbitration provisions into their collective
bargaining agreements in reliance of cases such as Almonte and
Austin. However, as discussed infra, the general consensus among
the federal courts is that mandatory arbitration agreements in the
collective bargaining context is precluded.
Gilmer permits the adoption of mandatory arbitration by non-
union employers.'39 However, as Lai140 and Farranda4' indicate,
mandatory arbitration agreements must specifically inform the
employee that his/her statutory rights to a judicial forum will be
waived. Therefore, employers must carefully craft provisions in
their handbooks, 142 manuals, and/or employment agreements to
advise employees that statutory claims will be subject to mandatory
arbitration. 143
Employers should also be advised that even under mandatory
arbitration regimes, certain due process requirements should be
adhered to. 44 The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in
Cole v. Burns International Security Services4 ' held that a
minimum level of due process must be imparted upon the arbitral
process in order for mandatory arbitration to withstand judicial
scrutiny.14 In Cole, Judge Harry T. Edwards, of the District of
Columbia Circuit, ruled that certain standards set forth in Gilmer
9 Gilmer v. Johnson, 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
"4o Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994).
141 Farrand v. Lutheran Brothers, 993 F.2d 1253,1255 (7th Cir. 1993).
142 Patterson v. Tenet Health Care Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that an employee may be bound by an arbitration provision in an employee
handbook); Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940 (D. N.J.
1991) (holding an arbitration provision in an employee handbook to be binding on
the employee).
143 See, e.g., Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756 (9th
Cir. 1997). In Nelson, the court held that any agreement to waive the right to
a judicial forum must be "explicitly presented to the employee and the
employee must explicitly agree to waive the specific right." Id. at 762.
" See Marjorie Icenogle & Robert Shearer, Emerging Due Process Standards
in Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes: New Challenges for
Employers, LAB. L. J. 81-90 (1997) (asserting the criteria that employers should
apply in order to withstand due process challenges to their compulsory arbitration
policies).
141 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
146 Id. at 1482.
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must be met in the arbitral process in order for mandatory
arbitration to be upheld.147 Arbitrators should be neutral (selected
by both employees and employers), discovery should be adequate
rather than minimal, the arbitrator's award must be written, and the
relief provided should be the same relief provided by statute."' In
addition, Judge Edwards held that the cost of the arbitral forum
should be borne completely by the employer." 9 If the employee is
required to pay any costs associated with the arbitration proceeding,
the agreement for mandatory arbitration will be unenforceable.'
The Cole court further concluded that in order to guarantee
substantive protection to employees, arbitral rulings should be
subject to meaningful judicial review, a standard higher than
ordinary deferential review applied by district courts reviewing
arbitration awards." In essence, Judge Edwards seeks to create a
hybrid procedure for arbitration review under the FAA." The
court in fact urged a more heightened judicial review when the
issues raised in arbitration address "novel or difficult legal"
issues.' By introducing heightened review, it appears that
arbitration may become a less expedient means of resolving
discrimination claims, as arbitrators will become more involved in
the claims adjudication. In any event, it appears that employers
must be prepared for such hybridization of the arbitration process,
in exchange for the option to impose compulsory arbitration.
The EEOC's Position
47 Id.
148 Id. at 1482-83.
149 Id. at 1485.
150 id.
151 Id. at 1486-87.
11 The Second Circuit, in DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynold, Inc., 121 F.3d 818
(2d Cir. 1997), recognized that courts may be called upon to administer a higher
standard of review when considering arbitration awards issued in statutory
employment discrimination cases. Id. at 825. Nevertheless, the DiPjissa court
failed to rule on this issue since it was never raised in the DiRussa's complaint.
Id. Curiously, the DiRussa court also rejected an award of attorneys fees despite
finding age discrimination in that case. Id. at 823.
151 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487.
1998 859
21
Case: Arbitration and Discrimination
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998
TOURO LAW REVIEW
The EEOC has taken the position that "mandatory binding
arbitration of discrimination claims as a condition of employment
not only denies the victims of discrimination their right of access to
the courts, but also prevents the courts from performing the
essential role of enforcing civil rights laws." 
154
The EEOC further contends that mandatory binding arbitration as
a condition of employment may also present structural biases in
favor of employers. 55 For example, an employer will have the
advantage of familiarity with the arbitral process, which may give it
an inherent benefit. Indeed, unlike the management-union model,
an individual employee and his/her counsel may be entirely
unfamiliar with the particular nuances of the arbitral process.156
Furthermore, the employer may represent to the "neutral"
arbitrator a potential source of future business. The EEOC's most
recent Policy Statement, dated July 10, 1997, reaffirmed the
Commission's opposition to binding arbitration as a condition of
employment. 15
7
Since 1988, the EEOC has litigated over 28 employment
discrimination suits challenging the growing trend toward
mandatory binding arbitration.1 58  The EEOC has unsuccessfully
argued against mandatory binding arbitration in at least three circuit
courts: the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal. At
the trial level in other circuits, the issue remains unresolved. 59
Notwithstanding the EEOC's position on mandatory arbitration,
the Commission does encourage voluntary alternative dispute
resolution (including arbitration) after the employment dispute has
arisen.16° In fact EEOC statistics reflect that charging parties are
'5 Mark Hansen, Contract Disputes, A.B.A. J., at 26.
155 Id.
156 Id. Arbitrators, unlike judges, often abandon the rules of evidence
permitting inclusion of evidence which may be objectionable under most federal
or state rules of evidence. Id.
157 Id.
158 id.
159 id.
160 EMPL. DISCRiM. REP., 9 BNA 124 (July 23, 1997).
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increasingly opting for EEOC-sponsored mediation of employment
disputes.16'
Notwithstanding support for voluntary dispute resolution, the
EEOC firmly opposes pre-dispute agreements or policies to
arbitrate statutory claims.'6 In fact, in a Massachusetts case,
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,'6 the EEOC argued that Gilmer is
no longer viable in the wake of recent congressional legislation.
First, the EEOC argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1991"6
encourages voluntary rather than mandatory arbitration. Under
the 1991 Civil Rights Act "[w]here appropriate and to the extent
authorized by law, the use of alternative dispute resolution,
including.., arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes
arising under [Title VII and the ADEA]."65
The EEOC finds support in the congressional record in arguing
against mandatory arbitration. One of the sponsors of the 1991
Civil Rights Act opined that the 1991 Act "contemplates the use of
voluntary arbitration to resolve specific disputes after they have
arisen, not coercive attempts to force employees in advance to
forego statutory rights."' 6
The EEOC has also taken the position6' that compulsory
agreements to arbitrate ADEA disputes are precluded by the Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 [hereinafter
"OWBPA"]. 161 The OWBPA was passed to prevent employer
coercion of employees into involuntary and unknowing waiver of
161 id.
162 EMPL. DIscRIM. REP., 9 BNA 118 (July 23, 1997).
" See Amious Curiae Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, No. Civ. A. 96-12267-NG 1998 WL
81907 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 1998).
I" Pub. L. 102-166.
165 Pub. L. 102-166, §118 (42 U.S.C. § 1981).
166 137 CONG. Rnc. H9530 (Daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Edwards). But see Austin, 78 F.3d at 881-82 (relying on the Civil Rights Act of
1991 for the proposition that Congress intended to further the use of all arbitration
including mandatory arbitration when it incorporated provisions supporting
"alternative means of dispute resolution.").
"6 See Anious Curiae Brief for EEOC, at 10-15, Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
Civ. No. 96-12267-NG (D. Mass. 1997).
'
68 Pub. L. 101-433.
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employee rights. The EEOC asserts that under OWBPA a waiver
is not considered knowing and voluntary if the rights or claims
occur after the waiver is executed. 169 If the EEOC's position is
adopted, then all pre-dispute waivers in ADEA actions will be
unenforceable.
The EEOC also contends that the legislative history of OWBPA
illustrates unambiguously the intention of Congress to protect the
ADEA claimant's right to trial by jury. 170 Accordingly, waiver of
the right to a jury resulting from mandatory arbitration would
contravene congressional intent.
In light of support in the congressional record, the potential
unavailability of full statutory remedies, and the Commission's
concerns regarding employees' inability to prospectively,
knowingly and voluntarily waive their statutory rights, the EEOC
has strongly resisted the utilization of mandatory arbitration.
Furthermore, the EEOC policy statement concerning its opposition
to mandatory arbitration suggests that its position will not readily
change.
The Employee Perspective
There is a dramatic gap between unionized and non-unionized
workers. As previously discussed, unionized workers in most
jurisdictions have the opportunity to prosecute discrimination claims
in two forums: arbitral and judicial. Meanwhile, their non-
unionized counterparts who execute agreements with arbitration
clauses generally are subject to mandatory arbitration in non-union
settings. Furthermore, many jurisdictions that require mandatory
arbitration construe arbitration provisions so broadly that claims for
any type of employment discrimination will be covered.
For non-union employees, then, compulsory arbitration appears
to be an increasingly utilized method of resolving complaints
"'
69 Id. at 11 (citing 29 U.S.C. §626(f)(1)(C)(1994)).
170 Id. at 13-14. The loss of the right to jury was identified by sponsors of the
legislation as a principal justification for adopting a limitation on the waiver of
ADEA rights. S. REP. No. 79, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13; H.R. REP. No.
664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24.
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alleged under employment discrimination statutes. Employees are
now faced with compulsory dispute resolution regimes that, from
the employees' perspective, appear to be deficient.
One significant contention of employee advocates is that
arbitration is biased in favor of employers because the bargaining
power of employers is significantly greater than employees. The
Gilmer Court summarily rejected this notion, finding that an
agreement to arbitrate is like any other contract, and if it is found to
be coerced or fraudulent, it will be invalidated.17' Otherwise, such
agreements will be enforceable.
Another criticism of the arbitral forum is that arbitration
procedures are too informal, and that the rules of evidence and
discovery are not strictly followed. The Supreme Court rejected
these arguments in Gilmer as well, finding that a discrimination
claimant bargains away certain procedural formalities in exchange
for the expedience and cost effectiveness of the arbitral process."
In the face of the judicial rejection of challenges to arbitration,
employees face a new landscape in resolving their discrimination
complaints. In this new environment, the discrimination claimant
must be prepared to advance his or her claim through the less
mechanistic and more informal arbitral procedures. Employees
must anticipate potential biases in the system that favor the
employer, create strategies for investigating and choosing
arbitrators, and frame subpoenas and discovery, among other
things.
In addition, Marjorie Icenogle and Robert Shearer offer several
recommendations for improving the compulsory arbitration regime
for employees. " For example, agreements to arbitrate should be
willing and knowing agreements to arbitrate. An employer could
assure that the agreement to arbitrate is willing and knowing by,
among other things, circulating literature explaining the advantages
and disadvantages of arbitration, allowing employees adequate time
171 500 U.S. 20, 33.
72Id. at 30.
1 Marjorie Icenogle and Robert Shearer, Emerging Due Process Standards in
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes: New Challenges for
Employers, LAB. L. J., Spring, 1997, at 89-90.
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to consult with advisers or attorneys regarding their decision to
arbitrate, and adopting policies that do not penalize employees who
choose not to arbitrate. 174
Employees should also demand from their employers that
arbitration procedures do not work to their disadvantage. For
example: they should be allowed to choose their representative,
participate in the selection of an arbitrator, have access to the
arbitrators' work histories prior to selection, have access to written
arbitrators decisions, and among other things, have access to
information that is relevant to the dispute.
It is now incumbent on employees when faced with a compulsory
arbitration system to pursue inclusion of as many of the above
criteria as possible. Inclusion of such standards in the arbitration
process may minimize the deficiencies inherent in mandatory
arbitration of statutory claims.
Conclusion
Arbitration has gained a hold in an arena once reserved only for
judicial resolution. Now federal courts are more and more
reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over statutory claims of
employment discrimination where arbitration agreements have been
entered into. Indeed, federal courts are compelling arbitration with
increasing frequency. The expanding employment discrimination
docket may have triggered the courts' frustration with litigation,
and its inclination towards arbitration.'75 Thus, understandably,
courts will more likely compel arbitration of employment claims
and preclude private litigation of such claims. In light of this trend
and the cautions imparted by Gilmer and recent decisions, both
employers and employees should commence setting essential due
process standards for arbitral dispute resolution of statutory claims.
174 id.
"75 Commentator Micheal Delikat provides several statistical indicators
reflecting an increase in employment discrimination claims, and suggests that
courts will more likely direct such claims to arbitration in an effort to manage
their dockets. Micheal Delikat, Binding Arbitration of Employment Claims: The
Shifting Landscape, 22 EMPL. REL. L. J., No. 4, Spring, 1997 at 25.
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